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GENDER AND NEGOTIATIONS: WHEN DOES GENDER PLAY A ROLE IN NEGOTIATING? 
 
KAREN HARRINGTON 
University of Rhode Island 
 
The fable takes place during the holidays, involving two sisters.  One sister is planning to bake a 
chiffon cake for Christmas dinner; the other, a fruitcake.  Both recipes each call for one orange.  
When the sisters check the pantry, they find only one orange, not the two they need.  An argument 
immediately erupts over who gets the orange.  One sister complains that the chiffon cake is wrong 
for the season.  The other retorts the fruitcake may be traditional but nobody likes it.  Obvious 
solutions are out of the question.  It being a holiday, they cannot borrow from the very neighbors 
who will later be their guests, and the stores are closed.  The sisters, unwilling to compromise and 
bake only half a recipe, become more and more entrenched in defending their rights.  After a fair 
amount of bickering, the mother cuts the orange in half.  A fair solution?  The needs of the sisters 
remained ambiguous throughout the argument. How would have the solution differed if the sisters 
were to explain their needs; while one sister needed orange peel, the other needed orange juice.  If 
chiffon cake was intended for solely one sister and the fruitcake was to be donated to another 
family, would the end result change? Would the sister making the fruitcake, on behalf of others, be 
more assertive in negotiating for the orange?  Would the situation change if this fable was written 
as an argument between a sister and brother?  Some say “yes” (Kolb, 2000) 
 
Catalyst, a research and advisory 
organization committed to advancing women in 
business, tracked the representation of women in 
Fortune 500 companies throughout the past 
decade.  According to the annual census, in 1995 
women held 8.7 percent of Fortune 500 
corporate officer positions.  With an increase of 
nearly 7 percent by 2002, the percentage of 
female representation had increased to 15.7 
percent, but still capped, however, at a very 
small percentage as it relates to the nearly 85 
percent male representation in the remaining 
upper-level corporate workforce (Wellington 
2003).  Research suggests obstacles to 
advancement may include lack of mentoring, 
commitment to personal or family 
responsibilities, limited opportunity for visibility 
and disparaging proportions in aggressively 
progressive career choices.  Although the 
stereotypical “glass ceiling” may indeed also 
play a role in impeding advancement, some may 
additionally cite a “glass wall”, building lateral 
barriers that limit women’s career potential 
almost from the beginning of their careers.  
Evidence suggests these barriers may not be 
necessarily constructed by formulized 
regulations or standards, but by women 
themselves and predicted patterns of behavior.1 
Pradel, Bowles, and McGinn (2005) 
describe this scenario. Maureen Park, the 
managing director of a small portfolio 
management firm, reports to a parent company.  
The parent company has been repeatedly 
performing below forecasts and morale among 
Park’s understaffed, overworked team of 
research analysts was low.  To make matters 
worse, Park’s two best analysts both requested 
significant raises after their annual reviews.  
Both women expressed their belief that they 
were earning substantially less than analysts at 
comparable firms and probably less than lower-
achieving members of their firm – including 
male colleagues who had been lured away from 
a competitor.   
Park went to bat for her star performers, 
though management had instructed her to offer 
only cost-of-living raises.  To her surprise, her 
superiors agreed to offer better incentives to 
both analysts.  Reflecting on her triumph, Park 
                                                   
1 Not in any way, should this statement be construed 
as placement of blame but merely a suggestive notion 
that some barriers as they relate to gender are results 
of habitual gender socialization repeated by women 
and their own perceived roles that narrow 
progression. 
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realized with bitter irony that three of her seven 
direct reports would make more the she would in 
the coming year; she herself had accepted a 
small cost-of-living raise without question.  If 
getting a raise was so easy, why hadn’t she made 
a case for herself? Is it possible that her gender 
somehow influenced how Park negotiated for 
herself and others (Pradel, 2005)? 
Babcock and Laschever (2003) describe an 
analogous study conducted by Jennifer Halpern 
and Judi McLean Parks utilizing undergraduates 
in a negotiations class at Carnegie Mellon 
University.  The class was separated into same-
sex groups of two and instructed to negotiate 
about allocating public money to build a 
children’s playground (establishing an 
undoubtedly competitive environment).  One 
member in each group was appointed to play the 
role of representative of the Parks Department; 
the other the representative of a community 
volunteer organization. 
Dramatic differences in negotiation behavior 
were exhibited between male and female teams.  
Males were more likely than females to talk 
about their positions (how much they wanted to 
see allocated to the project), with all of the male 
pairs discussing their positions but only 17 
percent of the female pairs doing so.  Males also 
used confrontational bargaining techniques 
(making threats or posing ultimatums) more, 
with men using confrontational tactics nine 
times as much as women did.  (Only two of the 
12 female pairs became confrontational at all.) 
In comparison, the female pairs talked about 
personal information far more than the males (92 
percent of the females compared to 23 percent of 
the males introduced information about 
themselves into the negotiation).  The personal 
information the women discussed was directly 
relevant to what each side wanted, and 
introducing this information into their 
negotiations helped expand their shared 
understanding of the goal on both sides.  In 
addition, when the women discussed personal 
information, they did so within the first five 
minutes of the negotiation (negotiating on behalf 
of others) but the men who introduced personal 
information did so only after 20 minutes of 
negotiation, and only when they were having 
difficulty reaching an agreement. 
Another remarkable finding from this study 
involved different ways in which the male and 
female negotiating teams dealt with the 
ambiguity in the case information provided to 
them.  Whereas 50 percent of the female pairs 
discussed how the playground would affect a 
senior citizen’s home nearby (falling in line with 
the women’s prescribed role as caretakers who 
look out for the interests of others), none of the 
male pairs took notice of this factor.  On the 
other hand, 58 percent of the males, but only 8 
percent of the females discussed legal liability 
issues.  This was particularly noteworthy 
because legal issues were not mentioned in the 
case materials – the men introduced them on 
their own. 
The results of Halpern and Park’s 
playground study strongly suggest that men 
typically focus more on the competitive 
elements of a negotiation (discussing their 
position from the outset, resorting to 
confrontational behavior, talking about each 
side’s legal responsibilities) while women focus 
more on the relational aspects – the needs of 
both sides and how the outcome of the 
negotiation will affect other people.  While men 
focused on the interests at hand, women focused 
on the relationship and the vested interest of the 
beneficiaries.  Maureen initially believed her 
negotiation to be successful, gaining a 
significant increase for her subordinates, yet 
later attaining a realization of personal neglect. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Some researchers and businesspeople may 
suggest studies to ask whether men or women 
are better negotiators, yet according to the 
research of Pradel, Bowles, and McGinn (2005), 
gender is not a reliable predictor of negotiation 
performance, but certain types of negotiation can 
“set the stage” for differences in processes and 
outcomes negotiated by men and women 
(Pradel, 2005).  In the example of Maureen 
Parks, Maureen found not only easier to 
negotiate on behalf of her employees, but failed 
to recognize the opportunity to negotiate a salary 
increase for herself.  In the playground study, 
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the competitive atmosphere and ambiguous 
details conveyed in the scenario directed gender-
stereotypical behaviors; while men negotiated 
with a confrontational style aiming for personal 
gain, women were more passive, with a 
personalized negotiation style and an aim for 
mutual gain.  Documenting specific cues which 
trigger such differences in behavior, this 
research review will theoretically answer when 
does gender play a role in negotiations? 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
The question of if and when gender plays a 
role in negotiations will be examined by 
reviewing the literature pertaining to negotiation 
styles.  As a basis of organization, the literature 
review will be divided into ten sections with 
each section based on an aspect of the 
negotiation process. These ten negotiation 
variables are initiation, ambiguity, styles, 
interests versus relationships, value system 
differences, level of competition, beneficiary, 
power differences, collective bargaining and 
definition of success. 
Initiation of the negotiation process or lack 
thereof will be first discussed as it differs across 
gender. Ambiguity and relating gender 
socialization stereotypes will be investigated and 
exemplified with both gathered literature and 
empirical research.  Kolb’s Theory of Shadow 
Negotiations assists in the source of ambiguity-
driven behaviors, while empirical studies 
completed by Kray and Galinsky (2002) and 
Babcock and Laschever (2003) place specific 
values on constraints, triggers or cues which 
provoke gender stereotypical behaviors and 
normally have an adverse effect on the 
negotiated outcomes.   As levels of competition 
undulate, levels of stereotypical gender-profiled 
characteristics are revealed, reviewed in 
Volkema’s (2004) nine-country study.  In 
addition, the beneficiary or receiver of the 
negotiation outcomes have an impact on the 
extent of gender differentiation.  Intrinsically 
captured, the notion of perceived power will 
have a direct effect on the projected amount of 
stereotypical gender-related behaviors displayed.  
This concept of perceived power will also 
include discussion of the Rotter’s Locus of 
Control Theory.  The presence of gender 
differentiations at the bargaining table will also 
be examined, reviewing Kolb’s research and 
theories and analytical data gathered by Walters’ 
62 study meta-analysis, comparing bargaining 
styles and approaches to collective bargaining.  
Concluding, discussion of advancements and 
theorized practices for alleviations of gender 
differentiations in negotiations will be reviewed 
and offered as new insights for further research. 
Initiation 
What is negotiable, and when should an 
individual attempt to negotiate, rather than 
accept, an outcome. While there are a host of 
authors claiming, everything is negotiable 
(Coehn, 1982; Covic, 2003: Kennedy, 1997), 
research tells us there are individual differences 
as to topics and situations that a appropriate for 
negotiation.  
Linda Babcock, a Carnegie Mellon professor 
and well-known lecturer within the field of 
women studies, conducted a study differences in 
starting salaries across genders (Babcock, 2002). 
Reviewing first year Carnegie Mellon master 
degree students, Babcock looked exclusively at 
gender, lending unsettling results. Starting 
salaries of the male graduates was on average 
6.7 percent or $4000 higher than their female 
counterparts.  To discern the difference, 
Babcock then reviewed who had negotiated the 
starting salary and who had simply accepted the 
initial offer.  While 57 percent of the male 
graduates negotiated beyond the initial offer, 
only 7 percent of female students did the same.  
Most noteworthy, the students who had 
negotiated their starting salaries were able to 
increase their initial earnings by 7.4 percent on 
average, or $4053 – mirroring the difference 
between the male and female starting rate, 
suggesting such gender discrepancies could have 
been reduced if the women had negotiated. 
Accessing when the ability to negotiate is 
feasible differs for men and women. Before the 
negotiation process even begins, different 
perceptions of the opportunity to negotiate 
occur.  To further delineate, examination of the 
cues to initiate the process needed to be 
investigated.  Babcock (2002) developed a 
theory he calls “Turnip or Oyster.”  This theory 
based on a spectrum of individual beliefs about 
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surrounding opportunities, simplifying the 
parameters based on popular clichés.  While 
some individuals believe “you can’t get blood 
from a turnip”, others tend to depict their 
surroundings in the view that “the world is your 
oyster”.  People with the first perspective view 
challenges in life as unchangeable and 
fundamentally “what you see is what you get”, 
while the other end of the spectrum tend to 
believe life is bursting with opportunities, 
challenging situations can be successful 
conquered and there is much to gain through 
negotiating for a more desirable outcome.  To 
testy the theory, Babcock and several colleagues 
at Carnegie Mellon University developed a 
systematic scale for what they call a “turnip to 
oyster” spectrum, which measures the degree to 
which an individual recognizes the opportunity 
to negotiate.  Conducted as a web survey, 
participants in a study using this scale were 
presented with a series of statements such as: 
• I think a person has to ask for what he or she 
wants rather than wait for someone to 
provide it. 
• There are many things available to people, if 
only people ask for them. 
• Many interactions I have during the day can 
be opportunities to improve my situation. 
Respondents were instructed to rate along a 
seven-point Likert-scale the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with each of the statements.  
Low scorers were individuals who viewed little 
benefit to negotiating and interpreted fewer cues 
for opportunities to negotiate, while high scorers 
were those individuals who perceived most 
situations as negotiable and adamantly searched 
for opportunities to negotiate.  Confirming the 
hypothesis of the research group, women were 
45 percent more likely than men to score low on 
the scale.  Further intensifying the difference, 10 
percent in the score difference equated to 30 
percent more attempts to negotiate (as depicted 
in an additional part of the web survey) 
(Babcock & Laschever 2003).   
Although the survey generated results which 
reinforce the gender differences in detecting 
situational cues for negotiating, Babcock’s 
experiment does suggest gender differences in 
confidence levels and a notion of underlying 
sense of pessimism among females.  Should this 
part of the results be acknowledged as simply a 
socially-reinforced behavior from recurring 
exposure to gender discrimination or is there any 
link between differentiating gender cues and the 
confidence placed on the negotiated results?   
Deborah Kolb, renowned author and speaker 
in fields of women studies and negotiations, 
developed a theory of Three A’s (attitudes) 
which trigger differentiation during negotiations 
(Kolb, 2000).  The first “A”, awfulizing, occurs 
for many women before a negotiations gets 
underway.  Without confidence in the capability, 
the ability to detect a negotiable opportunity is 
clouded.  The more evident the weakness, the 
more progressively impossible it becomes to 
recognize not only the opportunity but 
awareness of skills to be utilized to initiate the 
negotiation. 
When individuals are instructed to conduct a 
negotiation and are given explicit instructions 
with respect to negotiation, the gender gap is 
lessened, however, when the negotiability of the 
situation is less pronounced, men and women 
rely on their situational cues tell them when an 
opportunity for negotiation exists.  Small, 
Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2004), 
conducted a study to determine how the strength 
of cues affected the initiation of negotiation.  
The results of the study demonstrate the 
consequences of what is referred to as 
differential frames or environments with varying 
levels of situational triggers.  The prediction was 
gender differences in negotiation depends on the 
situational cues detectable in the environmental.  
Research participants (74; 35 males, 39 females) 
were instructed to play a word game (pilot 
testing showed no gender advantage in exchange 
for cash) and were offered the minimum 
payment possible.  Participants were measured 
as to whether they negotiated for a higher 
payment from the experimenter, (analogous to 
many career advancement opportunities). The 
first study centered on whether the participants 
would ask for money in a situation where they 
were not explicitly told that the payment was 
negotiable.  Instructed they would receive a 
minimum payment of $3 from the experimenter, 
the participants in the study were not given any 
 Schmidt Labor Research Center Seminar Research Series 5 
information on the how the payment was 
determined nor given any performance 
feedback.  Unknowingly, if the participants 
initiated a negotiation, they could receive more 
money (up to $10).  The participants were given 
four rounds of the word game, “Boggle”, played 
in a private cubicle.  Each round the participant 
was instructed to shake the container, let the 
cubes drop exposing a letter on each section of 
the grid, and was timed as they were to create as 
many words as possible from the letters until the 
time expired.  Following the completion, 
instructions were presented as a reminder to the 
participants: you have now completed the four 
rounds and will be compensated between $3 -
$10.  Please indicate to the experimenter that 
you are finished, so that they can score your 
rounds – then you will be paid.  Again, if the 
participant did not initiate a payment 
negotiation, the experimenter paid them $3.  If 
the participant asked for more, they were paid 
$10.  Although the results revealed a small 
proportion negotiated the payment without any 
cues, 23% of the male participants initiated, 
while only 3% of females participants initiated 
negotiation of the payment.   
In a second Small et al. (2004) study, cues 
were addressed under three conditions 1) 
control, 2) negotiating cue, 3) asking cue.  
Hypothesized, cueing to ask will increase the 
rates of the initiation of negotiation for a greater 
payment among the female participants, thereby 
reducing the gender gap.  Eighty-one male 
participants and 72 female participants 
participated in an exchange for cash payment, 
once again from $3 to $10.  The first condition 
was the control which replicated the previous 
study.  The second condition, participants read a 
negotiating cue: You will be compensated 
between $3 and $10.  The exact payment is not 
fixed, and you can negotiate for more if you 
want.  Many participants negotiate for a higher 
payment.  In the third condition, participants 
read an asking cue: You will be compensated 
between $3 and $10.  The exact payment is not 
fixed, and you can ask for more if you want.  
Many participants ask for a higher payment 
(Small et al.,  2004). 
The resulting data reinforced Small’s 
hypothesis that gender differences would depend 
on the situational cues.  Male participants asked 
significantly more frequently than females 
within each condition and even more so in the 
second condition.  The third condition reduced 
the gender gap by strengthening the situational 
cue, however eliminated ambiguous language.  
Whereby “negotiate” leaves room for ambiguity 
and suggests a competitive process for most 
women, the term “ask” required less confidence 
or preparation and a lower expectation for 
results.  Although the opportunity existed, the 
cue for negotiating was given along with a 
notion of challenge, uncertain parameters and 
ambiguity.  As Babcock (1999) stated, “women 
often do less well in negotiating environments 
not simply because they adopt inferior tactics, 
but rather because they do not recognize when 
they are (or should be) negotiating and what 
they are negotiating about.” 
Results of these studies provide support for 
the hypothesis that men and women differ as to 
when to negotiate and as to what topics or issues 
are appropriate for negotiation.  It appears that, 
in general, men are more likely than women to 
view an exchange as an opportunity to negotiate 
while women seem more likely to accept an 
initial offer in an exchange. 
Ambiguity 
When individuals understand little about the 
limits of the bargaining range and appropriate 
standards for agreement, the ambiguity of a 
negotiation increases.  The more ambiguous the 
situation with respect to the appropriateness of 
negotiation, the more likely gender triggers 
(situation cues that prompt male-female 
differences in preferences, expectation, and 
behaviors) will influence negotiation outcomes.  
Referring back to the previous story of Maureen 
Park in the introduction, many ambiguous 
factors surrounded the scenario.  The outcomes 
of Maureen’s negotiation for higher salaries for 
her employees leads one to speculate that there 
were many inconsistencies in the firm that were 
causing a bit of unrest – a clash between skill 
level, experience and responsibilities were 
coupled with needs for retention allowing for a 
an environment to exist where both the 
opportunities to negotiate and the content of 
what was negotiable was blurred.  While 
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FIGURE 1 
Industry Structural Ambiguity 
Industry in Descending Order of Ambiguity 
High Ambiguity Industries:  
31% of sample; M=4.50, Max=5.33, Min = 3.33 
  Entertainment/media 
  Retail 
  Advertising/marketing 
  Other services (computer, transportation) 
  Manufacturing 
  Health/Human services 
  Financial services 
  Telecommunications 
Low Ambiguity Industries:  
69% of sample; M=6.20, Max=6.67, Min = 5.67 
  High Technology 
  Venture capital/private equity 
  Consumer products 
  Venture capital/private equity 
  Consumer products 
 
Maureen negotiated greater salaries for her 
employees to retain her key performers, she 
failed to recognize the situational cues for 
herself and the need and parameters for 
negotiating her own salary and promotion.  
When opportunities and limits are unclear, there 
becomes an attraction to situational cues which 
trigger different behaviors in men and women.  
In contrast, low ambiguity may succumb a 
greater understanding of the range of negotiated 
payoffs and standard resulting values, whereby 
the outcomes are less likely to reflect gender 
triggers. 
Bowles, Riley, Babcock, and McGinn 
(2005) explored the concept of ambiguity as it 
relates to negotiation and gender differences.  
Based upon the psychological theories of 
Mischel (1977) and his notion of strong versus 
weak situations2 as well as the research of 
Snyder and Ickes’ (1985) concept of 
precipitation situations, Bowles and her 
colleagues adapted these concepts to study 
gender in negotiation in terms of “situational 
ambiguity” and “gender triggers.”  They 
hypothesized that the degree of ambiguity within 
a negotiation situation moderates the influence 
of individual difference, such as gender, on 
negotiation performance.  Specifically, the more 
ambiguity there is in the negotiation situation, 
the more potential there is for the individual 
difference to affect performance.  Structural 
ambiguity refers to the degree of uncertainty in 
individual’s understanding of the economic 
structure of negotiation (Bowles, et al.  2005).  
The less that individuals understand about the 
limits of the bargaining range and appropriate 
standards for agreement, the more ambiguity 
there is in the negotiation situation.  Gender 
triggers are the situational factors which 
“precipitate” gender effects by prompting 
gender-related behavioral responses (Bowels, et 
al.,  2005). 
In the first study, the participants were MBA 
students who responded to an online job 
                                                   
2 A strong situation is indicated by highly valued 
outcomes, strong likelihood of outcome occurring, 
and high specificity of requirements associated with a 
behavior or set of behaviors. 
placement survey administered by the career 
offices of a major American business school.  
There were 525 cases (358 men, 176 women).  
The log of self-reported base salary offer 
accepted acted as the dependent measure, while 
lists of industry categories were constructed to 
rate structural ambiguity.  Structural ambiguity 
in this construct was measured by the perceived 
expectation of salary discussions with 
prospective employers.  As the predicted 
expectation narrowed, the level of ambiguity 
lessened.  The average salary accepted by male 
MBAs in the sample was $5,941 higher than the 
average salary accepted by female MBAs.  
Controlling for pre-MBA work experience, job 
market activity, geographic location and job 
preferences, the salaries accepted by women 
were 5% lower on average than those accepted 
by male MBAs.  Finally, a significant gender – 
structural ambiguity interaction, indicates a 3% 
gender difference in low ambiguity industries as 
compared to a 10% gender difference in high 
ambiguity industries (Bowles, et al.  2005). See 
Figure 1 below. 
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In high structural ambiguity scenarios, the 
gender gap in starting salaries approached 
$10,000, even after controlling for the wide 
array of salary predictors.  What Bowles’ study 
illustrates is a demonstration that the effect of 
gender on MBA salary negotiations is 
contingent on the degree of uncertainty about the 
potential range and appropriate standards for the 
agreement (structural ambiguity). 
Deborah Kolb developed a constructed 
“self-help” theory for women in negotiations 
called the Theory of Shadow Negotiations based 
entirely on the premise that during negotiations 
women need to discern all of the ambiguous 
triggers; how to recognize the unspoken 
attitudes, hidden assumptions, and conflicting 
agendas that play out in the bargaining process 
(Kolb, 2000).  In ambiguity, unfortunately, lies a 
trend for women to perceive they deserve less 
than men.  Two Social Psychologists at the State 
University of New York at Buffalo, Brenda 
Major and Ellen Konar, conducted a mail survey 
of students in management programs at the 
University.  The survey asked students to 
indicate their expected earnings during their 
projected career peak (a quite ambiguous 
question with uncertain parameters and varying 
expectations).  In the study, they ruled out 
several potential explanations such as gender 
differences in pay importance or importance of 
doing interesting work, gender differences in 
perception of skills and gender difference in 
supervisors’ assessments.  It was found that men 
expected to earn about 13 percent more than the 
women during their first year of working full-
time and expected to earn 32 percent more at 
their career peaks. (Babcock & Laschever 2003).  
Disturbing as they may be, the results indicate a 
much greater scope of divergence.  The 
more ambiguous the negotiating environment 
and parameters, the greater the likelihood gender 
will play a role in negotiating, further 
segregating the two sexes in their negotiating 
style and behaviors. 
DIFFERENCES IN STYLES 
It is generally recognized that there are five 
styles of conflict resolution.  A forcing or 
competing style is based on the use of one 
party’s relative power over the other as one 
party attempts to achieve its goals without 
concern for the interests of the other party.  
Withdrawal or accommodating involves 
acquiescence of one party’s goals and interests 
to the other party.  When the parties act to 
suppress the conflict and not deal with it openly, 
smoothing or avoidance is being used.  
Compromise is used when each party gives up 
something in order to get part of what it wants.  
Finally, collaboration or problem solving is the 
style characterized by an attempt to arrive at a 
win-win solution (Thomas, 1992).  Furthermore, 
individuals are believed to have a dominant style 
of conflict resolution which they are more likely 
to use across conflict situations. 
With respect to the focal question, this 
section examines the relationship between 
gender and the frequency of use of the various 
conflict resolution styles and the factors that 
influence these styles. 
Assertiveness 
Research of gender stereotypical behavior 
suggests that men act aggressively, 
independently, and rationally whereas women 
act emotionally, passively, and socially-
motivated.  Research of negotiation stereotypes 
propose women must adopt stereotypically 
masculine bargaining style to “succeed” in 
negotiating.  Figure 2 below depicts this 
argument. 
Regardless of whether an individual 
supports this point of view, simple awareness of 
the connection can exert an influence on 
bargaining behavior.  Bem’s Gender Schema 
Avoiding 
Cooperative 
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Uncooperative 
Compromise 
Collaborating 
Accommodating 
Source: Thomas, 1991 
Figure 2 
Assertiveness and Cooperativeness
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theory in 1981 laid the groundwork for much 
this concept.  Bem suggested people interpret 
the world through the lens of stable schemas 
developed at an early age that speak to what it 
means to be a man versus a woman.  A basic 
assumption of this perspective is that self-
construals dictate people’s understandings of 
appropriate behavior, such that women see 
themselves in relation to others whereas men see 
themselves as independent from others (Kray & 
Thompson, 2004).  Applying this assumption to 
negotiations, the research suggests women tend 
to view negotiations as including the 
relationship component.  Likewise, to the extent 
women perceive negotiations as a masculine 
task; they are likely to have lower self-
confidence in the realm than men.   
Interests versus Relationships 
Another way to view the choice of styles is 
to examine the effects of the various styles on 
building and maintaining interpersonal 
relationships.  This relationship can be seen in 
figure 3. 
Substantive, or issue based conflict, often 
leads to some level of emotive, or emotional, 
conflict.  Individuals placing high importance on 
the maintenance of a relatinship work to avoid 
increasing the level of emotive conflict an thus 
tend to avoidance, accomodation and, to some 
extent, collaboration. 
Deborah Tannen in the 1990’s discussed the 
differences in conversational styles between 
women and men which is quite relevant to the 
self-construal theoretical perspective.  Tannen 
argues men seek independence through their 
conversational interactions whereas women 
week intimacy and consensus, paralleling the 
self-construal concepts (Tannen, 1999).   To 
attain such conversational goals, men may take 
on a more aggressive, self-gain approach while 
women will attempt to establish closeness and 
confidence in order to build a partnership with 
whomever they are speaking.  As it relates to 
negotiations, men will tend to take on a 
confrontational style during the negotiation 
process while women will focus on the 
relationship at hand and mutual outcomes.   
In writing about women and negotiation, 
Miller and Miller (2002) point out that men tend 
to use more aggressive styles of negotiation, 
while women tend to favor more relational 
styles.  The specific behaviors associated with 
these styles are found in figure 4. 
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Figure 3 
Task vs. Relationship Importance
Importance of maintaining relationship 
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COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATING STYLE (Stereotypically Male) 
• You want to get down to the business at hand as quickly as 
possible. 
• Small talk is kept to a minimum except where it facilitates 
the negotiation. 
• Before you begin to negotiate you want to find out about 
your counterpart’s status and make them aware of yours. 
• You give weight to what people say because of the position 
they hold. 
• A discussion is not considered successful unless you have 
made progress toward reaching a favorable agreement. 
• Satisfying the other parties’ interests is significant only to 
the extent that furthers your own interests. 
• You want to reach an agreement as quickly and as 
efficiently as possible. 
• The outcome of this negotiation takes priority, although you 
take into consideration the impact your actions might have 
on future dealings. 
 
RELATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLE (Stereotypically Female) 
• You want to get to know the other person first, before you 
begin to negotiate. 
• You would consider it rude not to talk about family and 
personal matters before getting down to business. 
• You do not feel comfortable talking about your status and 
achievements because you do not want to appear to be 
boastful. 
• The positions people occupy means less than the positions 
they take when negotiating and your relationship with them. 
• You consider time spent establishing a better relationship to 
be time well spent. 
• You want the other parties to feel good when the 
negotiations are concluded. 
• You are willing to take the time necessary to satisfy 
everyone’s needs. 
• Considerations of the long-term relationship are as 
important as the outcome of any single negotiation. 
Figure 4 
Gender-Stereotyped Negotiating Styles 
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Value System Differences 
Another aspect of this theoretical 
perspective proposes gender differences in moral 
reasoning.  Suggesting that men and women 
differ in their value systems, Gilligan disputed 
that women are distinct from men in their 
preferences for resolving moral conflicts: 
justice-based versus care-based.  Research by 
Gilligan supports that women are more likely to 
express an ethic of care whereas men exhibit a 
greater tendency to understand moral dilemmas 
from a justice perspective (Kray & Thompsen 
2004).  In recalling the earlier research from 
Jennifer Halpern and Judi McLean Parks, 58 
percent of the males in the study created legal 
support for the argument as playground 
department representative, while women were 
50 percent more likely to take on the role of 
care-giver and argue for the effects on the senior 
citizen home. 
In Kray and Thompson’s research, 
contextual cues or triggers in the environment 
determine whether individual variables like 
gender emerge to account for variation in 
behavior.  The underlying belief in this theory is 
that variables are expected to be more 
pronounced in weak situations, which allow for 
more personal interpretations, than strong 
situations, which have clear guidelines for 
appropriate behaviors.  Recalling from previous 
ambiguity discussion, when individuals are 
instructed to conduct a negotiation and are 
possibly given explicit instructions and details, 
the gender gap is lessened.  
Roger Volkema, Professor at American 
University in Washington D.C., further expands 
on the notions of Kray and Thompsen, in his 
depiction of Bem’s Gender Socialization 
Theory.  According to theory, “boys are 
socialized at a young age to respect rules, justice 
and individual rights, while girls are taught to 
consider issues in terms of relationships, 
compassion and inclusion.  Oriented more 
towards self than others, males are generally 
inclined to pursue competitive success at the 
expense of interpersonal relationships, believing 
that a successful outcome (end) will justify the 
means” (Volkema, 2004). 
In comparison, according to Psychologist 
Patricia Farrell, women are socially reinforced 
with the notion of a certain etiquette that is 
required in order to maintain relationships.  
More importantly, this relationship etiquette is 
carried over to negotiations (Miller and Miller, 
2002).  Indirect and socially-motivated in their 
negotiating style, women tend to “work out” 
solutions while maintaining the relationship 
rather than drive for the greater gain.  Varying 
styles are characterized in figure 4 above. 
The different negotiating styles of men and 
women have a propensity to be displayed in a 
corresponding manner with the communication 
styles, as expressed earlier through the 
conversational studies of Deborah Tannen.  
Evidence would suggest gender displays itself 
during the negotiating process in preferred styles 
and sources of motivation or direction. 
Level of Competition 
Competitive negotiations can act as triggers, 
analogous with societal expectations that men 
are more likely than women to be competitive 
and to “succeed” in competitive environments.  
The question of whether men and women differ 
in their degree of competitiveness was addressed 
in the research of Walters, Stulhmacher and 
Meyer in 1998 in a meta-analysis of 62 
experiments.  Consistent with what gender 
research suggests men were more competitive 
than women, as measured by their offers and 
verbal exchanges. Kray and Thompsen reiterated 
this earlier evaluation.  In 1996, Martell, Lane 
and Emrich demonstrated in a computer 
simulation that gender differences that explain 
only 1% of variance in performance evaluations 
led to large differences in the rate of career 
advancement for men and women climbing a 
hypothetical corporate ladder.  Comparable 
results in the areas of competition and for 
example, starting salaries, can leave 
compounding effects years later (Kray & 
Thompsen 2004).   
In 2002, Professor Roger Volkema 
conducted extensive research, a nine-country 
analysis, of how demographics, culture and 
economic predictors affect negotiation behavior 
(as they relate to perceived ethicality).  Volkema 
centered much his research on Hofstede’s four 
primary dimensions of national culture: power 
distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty 
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avoidance, and masculinity-femininity (later a 
fifth was added, long-term orientation).   
Masculine cultures value assertiveness, 
competition, justice and performance, whereas 
feminine cultures – the opposite – are oriented 
more towards nurturance, compassion, and 
quality of life (Volkema 2002).   
Volkema hypothesized male respondents in 
his study would find competitive and 
questionable negotiating behaviors to be more 
appropriate and would indicate a greater 
likelihood of using those behaviors than would 
female respondents.  In addition, masculinity 
would be directly related to the perceived 
appropriateness and the likelihood of using 
competitive and questionable negotiation 
behaviors.  The participants in the study were 
652 individuals attending graduate business and 
managerial/executive training programs in their 
home countries and 74 percent of the group were 
males.  Each of Hofstede’s four dimensions was 
examined independently and the data was 
collected over a 4-year period.  Respondents 
were asked to complete the “Incidents in 
Negotiation Questionnaire” which was 
developed by Lewicki et al in 1997.  The 
questionnaire focused on 18 competitive or 
questionable negotiation behaviors.  These 
behaviors represent a continuum of tactics (from 
generally accepted behaviors to unaccepted 
tactics) which have been found to factor into 
five categories; traditional competitive 
bargaining, misrepresentation of information, 
bluffing, influencing an opponent’s professional 
network, and inappropriate information 
collection (Volkema, 2002).  For each of the 18 
behaviors, respondents indicated on a seven-
point Likert scale the appropriateness of the 
behavior and their likelihood of using the 
behavior.   
The results of factor analysis generally 
coincided with the theories of Lewicki and 
hypotheses of Volkema.  In terms of predictors 
of perceived appropriateness, gender was 
statistically significant for all five categories of 
negotiation behavior, (while age was significant 
for bluffing and information collection).  For 
gender, males found the behaviors to be more 
appropriate than did female respondents in each 
case, consistent with original hypothesis.  In 
addition, masculinity was directly related to 
information collection (extent of preparation).   
Beneficiary 
Earlier review referenced Deborah Kolb’s 
Three A theory of gender in negotiations.  The 
second “A” refers to accommodation; “trapped 
in a desire to satisfy everyone, research suggests 
women tend to forget about being fair to 
themselves” (Kolb 2000).  Labeled as 
“nurturers” and “peacekeepers”, women are 
typecast into the caregiver role fixated with an 
“intuitive aptitude for collaboration”.  Similarly, 
as previously discussed, women in the Halpern 
and Parks study, adapted the caregiver role 
without any explicit cues.   
Evidence would suggest women tend to 
negotiate with greater tenacity when the 
negotiation will benefit others for mutual gain 
rather than personal gain. Just as with Maureen 
Parks in the introduction, there is a tendency to 
adjust the negotiation in response to the other 
person’s needs, and a failure to reckon the end 
cost of the concessions.  In another Babcock 
study, a large group of executives were asked to 
negotiate compensation for an internal candidate 
for a new management position.  Half negotiated 
as the candidate; the other half as the candidate’s 
mentor.  The negotiators were given no 
reference points or standards for the agreement, 
creating a highly ambiguous scenario.  Female 
executives negotiating as the mentor secured 
compensation that as 18 percent higher than the 
compensation female executives negotiated 
when they were playing the candidate.  (The 
male executives negotiated on a consistent basis 
across roles) (Pradel et al., 2006). 
Representation role (negotiating for oneself 
or someone else) is a potential gender trigger in 
negotiation, according to Bowles, Babcock and 
McGinn.  Three areas of psychological theory 
were discussed in relation.  Entitlement suggests 
women (as compared to men) have a tendency to 
take on a relative lack of deservedness that they 
do not extend to others.  If this sense of 
entitlement occurs and the woman is negotiating 
on behalf of others, that advocacy may lead 
them to have higher negotiation expectations.  
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Another area of psychological research which 
supports the advocate/agent theory in 
negotiating is that women (as compared to men) 
are “more constrained by gender roles and 
stereotypes from advocating freely” (Bowles, 
2005).  Bowles sites the research of Rudman and 
Glick whose findings in 1999 indicated women 
(as compared to men) who self-promote run a 
greater risk of social backlash.  Finally, a third 
explanation of the representation (advocacy) role 
is an adoption of the research of Cross and 
Madson in 1997 who theorized that women tend 
to develop more interpersonally interdependent 
self-construals than do men.  For these 
individuals who identify themselves 
interdependently, the motivation during 
negotiations and the motivation in social 
behavior is the obligation to others and a need to 
respond to social needs.  “The core implication 
of Cross and Madson’s studies for gender and 
negotiation is that women may be especially 
motivated in negotiations in which they are 
responsible for representing the interests of 
another person s compared to situations in which 
they are representing only their own self-
interest.  As illustrated, the one trigger that 
favors women over men is playing the role of 
the advocate or agent as opposed to playing the 
role of principal or self-promoter” (Bowles 
2005).   
Power Differences 
Power, the ability to control resources, 
evident during the negotiation process is rarely 
distributed evenly.  It is hypothesized that if 
there were to be equal power and equal 
perceived power, the outcome would hold a 
greater likelihood of also being equal, following 
a more integrative approach3.  .  The extent of 
power or perceived power has a tendency to be 
directly related to the extent that gender typical 
behaviors will be exhibited during negotiations.  
The greater the power an individual brings to the 
table, the more likely the other individual will 
recognize the cue to revert to gender-typical 
behavior.  The greater an individual perceives 
                                                   
3 Perceived power is referred to as the extent to which 
individuals are perceived to have power in directing 
results during negotiations, which trigger a difference 
in behavior 
the other to have such power; again, the more 
likely that individual is to respond with gender-
typical behavior.   
Related to power is status, which refers to 
the legitimate authority, vested in certain 
organizational or societal roles (Kray and 
Thompsen, 2004).  Status impacts what behavior 
is expected from a given individual, an influence 
on the relationship and negotiation outcomes.  In 
a field study, conducted by Kanter in the late 
1970s, examiners reviewed the sociological 
processes of women in a large industrial 
corporation.  Women’s status affected the level 
of attention bequeathed on them and how they 
were perceived by others.  Findings also 
indicated a numerical minority of women 
rendered them disproportionately visible in the 
corporation, perceptions of differences between 
women and men were polarized and 
exaggerated, and perceptions of women were 
distorted to fit the gender stereotype about their 
social group (Kray and Thompsen 2004).  One 
could assertively hypothesize the relationship 
between status and gender stereotype activation 
in Kanter’s study indicates a strong cue for 
gender-typical negotiation behaviors. 
Based on the research of Julian Rotter, the 
Social Learning Theory and Locus of Control 
Theory are important backdrops in the power 
concept.  The main idea in Julian Rotter's Social 
Learning Theory is that personality represents an 
interaction of the individual with his or her 
environment.  Rotter has four main components 
to his social learning theory model predicting 
behavior: behavior potential, expectancy, 
reinforcement value, and the psychological 
situation.  Behavior potential is the likelihood of 
engaging in a particular behavior in a specific 
situation.   Expectancy is the subjective 
probability that a given behavior will lead to a 
particular outcome, or reinforcer; expectancies 
are formed based on past experience. The more 
often a behavior has led to reinforcement in the 
past, the stronger the individual’s expectancy 
that the behavior will achieve that outcome now.  
Reinforcement is another name for the outcomes 
of our behavior. Reinforcement value refers to 
the desirability of these outcomes. Things we 
want to happen, that we are attracted to, have a 
high reinforcement value. Things we don't want 
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to happen, that we wish to avoid, have a low 
reinforcement value.  Although the 
psychological situation does not figure directly 
into Rotter's formula for predicting behavior, 
Rotter believed it’s always important to keep in 
mind that different individuals interpret the same 
situation differently.  
 Locus of control refers to individuals’ 
general, cross-situational beliefs about what 
determines whether or not they get reinforced in 
life.  Individuals can be classified along a 
continuum from very internal to very external.  
Individuals with a strong internal locus of 
control believe that the responsibility for 
whether or not they get reinforced ultimately lies 
with them; these are what Babcock would refer 
to as the “oyster” individuals. Internalists 
believe that success or failure is due to their own 
efforts. In contrast, externalists believe that the 
reinforcers in life are controlled by luck, chance, 
or powerful others; what Babcock would refer to 
as the “turnip” individuals. External locus of 
control individuals see little impact of their own 
efforts on the amount of reinforcement they 
receive.   
In terms of negotiations, researchers have 
measured the extent to which individuals believe 
that their behavior influences their 
circumstances.  Evidence has shown that 
individuals with an internal locus of control 
spontaneously undertake activities to advance 
their own interests more than individuals with an 
external locus of control.  Internal individuals 
are more likely to seek out additional 
information in terms of goal attainment, are 
more likely to be assertive and are less 
vulnerable to negative feedback.  According to 
Linda Babcock, the average scores for women 
are significantly higher on the locus of control 
scale than men; indicating a greater likelihood to 
divert causation to external forces, rather 
personal influence (Babcock 2003).     
Power during negotiations refers to level of 
influence and ability to control resources.  
Perceived power is the level of influence an 
individual is believed to possess during the 
process.  Status is what one brings to the table 
which equates a certain level of perceived 
power.  Research reveals a direct relationship 
between power and the extent gender exhibits 
differentiating behaviors; the more power 
perceived at the table, the greater the likelihood 
gender typical behavior patterns will be cued.  
How much power one has at the table may also 
be correlated in negotiations with the availability 
of alternatives or BATNA, as it relates to 
collective bargaining. 
Collective Bargaining 
In a study conducted by Kray, Reb, 
Galinsky, and Thompson, negotiators in the 
study who had a strong alternative to the current 
negotiation (BATNA4) were predicted to have 
larger payout than the negotiators with a weak 
alternative.  The effect of power, measured by 
the strength of the BATNA, was analyzed along 
with gender stereotypes which were explicitly 
activated in relation to higher levels of power.  
In other words, the prediction tested was the 
level of the BATNA would be directly related to 
the level of power, which would be displayed 
during the negotiations through gender-typical 
behaviors.  Two examinations were tested; one, 
how the relative strength of each negotiator’s 
best alternative to the current negotiation, or 
BATNA, affects the division of resources, and 
two, how the manner in which gender 
stereotypes are activated in the mind of the 
negotiators affects bargaining agreements (Kray, 
et al 2002).  One factor the researchers pointed 
out to consider in a study concerning the 
relationship between power and gender during 
negotiations is “whether societal expectations 
regarding power differ according to gender” 
(Kray, et al 2002).   
The design of the experiment was a 2x2 
factorial with gender stereotype activation and 
negotiator power as between-dyad factors.  The 
participant sample was comprised of 50 
undergraduate students in a business school at a 
large southwestern university (and informed 
they had a chance to win a monetary prize based 
on negotiation performance).  In the first group 
participants were told that effective negotiators 
                                                   
4 BATNA is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement or a worst acceptable outcome (Fisher & 
Ury, 1981) 
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displayed a listing of traits, all of which were 
stereotypically masculine, but in another group 
participants were told that traits associated with 
effective negotiators tend to vary across gender, 
whereas no association was made between 
effective negotiator traits and gender.  
Negotiator power was manipulated on the basis 
of the negotiator’s best alternative to the 
negotiated agreement (BATNA).  Instructions 
given to each participant indicated that the goal 
of each negotiator was to earn as many points as 
possible in the negotiation.  Each participant was 
given private role information that indicated 
their preferences in negotiation.  After reviewing 
the role instructions, negotiators completed a 
pre-negotiation questionnaire that included the 
measure of the negotiator’s goal and reservation 
price.  On a five-point scale, participants also 
indicated their perceived power and perceived 
diagnosticity of the negotiation.  Upon 
completion, participants began negotiating, 
videotaped. 
The negotiation was centered on what the 
researchers call, the New Recruit simulation, or 
negotiation between a job candidate and a 
recruiter.  Eight issues were addressed and given 
points with a possible 8,400 to 13,200 points 
available.  While gender-stereotype activation 
was manipulated through the letter of the 
“effective negotiator”, power was manipulated 
through the implementation of an urgent 
message.  High power negotiator received a 
message stating another party was willing to 
settle on a contract worth 4,500 points 
(described as quite favorable), while the lower 
negotiator was told that another party was 
willing to settle on a contract worth 2,200 points 
(described as not favorable).  Both negotiators 
were informed that the average agreement was 
worth 3,000. 
Consistent with the original hypothesis, high 
power negotiators regarded their BATNA as 
more attractive than low power negotiators.  
High power negotiators believed they derived 
more power from their BATNA and perceived a 
greater advantage through their role.  Having an 
attractive alternative to the current negotiation 
exerted a clear influence on one’s ability to 
demand resources in the current negotiation.  
The activation of stereotypes impacted the 
division of resources in integrative negotiations, 
but did not influence the creation of resources.  
The effect of stereotype activation depended on 
the relative strength of the BATNA; explicitly 
activating stereotypes about gender differences 
led to a greater use of power in the negotiation.  
This result suggests if the power position of the 
stereotyped individual is weak, an explicit 
confrontation with the stereotype results in 
performance that is even worse than under 
implicit activation of the stereotype.   
Keeping in my mind figure two, many 
women equate negotiation with confrontation.  
Associating the process with a battle, not only 
does that connotation act as a deterrent to the 
negotiating process, but allows for a viewpoint 
that the conflict inherent in negotiating also 
jeopardizes the relationship at hand.  In most 
negotiations, substantive and relationship issues 
are largely independent.  This notion relates to 
collective bargaining in the gender differences in 
bargaining style preferences. 
Applying earlier moral perspectives to 
negotiations suggests that men and women differ 
in how they resolve disputes, while also possibly 
playing a role in the determination of fairness in 
the division of resources.  If men place a higher 
premium on justice-based morality than do 
women, then it lends itself to a preference of 
rights-based arguments.  In contrast, women’s 
tendency to view morality through a care-based 
perspective, the might prefer a collaborative 
interest-based approach to negotiating.  
Theoretically, however, the more “traditional” 
the approach, the greater the likelihood gender 
triggered behaviors will manifest themselves 
(Kray & Thompsen, 2004).   
To address the question of whether gender 
truly impacts bargaining style, refer back to the 
Walters, et al meta-analysis.  During the 
extensive study, Walters and researchers 
examined negotiation patterns and trends of 
mixed-gender interaction.  In one study utilizing 
an abstract prisoner’s dilemma type-games 
(PDGs) and face-to-face behavioral negotiation 
tasks, (in a cooperative environment) men acted 
in a manner that would suggest a concern with 
the relationship by asking questions, engaging in 
more self-disclosures and the using the “we” 
pronoun more frequently.  On the other hand, in 
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a more competitive environment, most findings 
suggested that women demonstrated greater 
concern for the relationship than men.  For 
example, according to Kray, men used more 
self-helpful information and mentioned money 
earlier suggesting a lack of concern for the 
relationship.  “Whereas men centered their 
discussion around positions, women discussed 
more personal information than men did” (Kray 
and Thompsen, 2004). Overall, women reported 
a greater belief that the cooperative choice 
(analogous to Interest-Based Bargaining) was a 
better one for maximizing their own score than 
men did. 
Successful Results 
Gender plays a role in negotiating also in the 
perception of the successful outcomes; while 
men may tend to perceive success as the level of 
personal gain, women may perceive it as conflict 
avoidance, working towards mutually beneficial 
results.  Recall the story of the orange – 
preoccupied with the individual needs, possibly 
negotiating on behalf of the beneficiaries of the 
holiday desserts, each overlooked the actual 
ingredients, the problem, in order to incorporate 
a mutually-beneficial solution.  While one sister 
grates the orange, the other sister can then use it 
for squeezing the juice out.  Focusing on the 
problem without acknowledging the personal 
interests and needs can push the results further 
into a win-lose conflict.  Exemplified repeatedly, 
women tend to favor an avoidance of 
confrontation.  The final “A” of Deborah Kolb’s 
Three A theory is avoidance; when negotiation 
equates with confrontation, distaste leads to 
avoidance (Kolb, 2000).  In the care-taker role 
or an advocate for another individual, 
negotiating with higher expectations is palatable.  
When the situation is reversed towards personal 
gains, however, many women adapt an 
avoidance approach rather than engaging in a 
situation which could be deemed combative or 
confrontational.  In essence, success could be 
considered as reaching one’s BATNA while 
avoiding confrontation and maintaining the 
current relationship.  “Economic payoff is 
generally considered the most important 
measure of success in negotiation.  But when 
talks take place between people with ongoing 
social or professional ties, implementation of the 
agreement becomes another critical factor.  After 
all, a single deal is of limited value; but strong, 
stable relationships provide rewards across years 
of negotiations” (McGinn, 2004). 
Hannah Riley, a doctoral candidate at 
Harvard Business School, was recently quoted in 
Harvard’s online journal, Working Knowledge: 
“In a recent survey, where there was potential to 
expand the pie, what we found was that men 
were better at claiming the pie.  On the other 
hand, woman-woman dyads were the best at 
expanding the pie” (Lagace, 2000).  Men were 
not better negotiators; the women had a different 
set of expectations.   
CONCLUSION: NEW MILLENNIUM 
The findings become increasingly important 
when the differences are potentially damaging to 
the opposite sex.  According to the research of 
Linda Babcock, men are 8 times more likely to 
negotiate starting salaries following college 
graduation.  A career progression started at 
different salary points will act as a foundation 
for what some call the “escalator principle” or 
continued differentiation at a proportional rate, if 
the behavioral patterns persist.  In the Bowles 
study of structural ambiguity across industries, 
assuming that the MBAs graduate at the age of 
30 and work until they retire at 65, assuming 
they receive 3% raises every year – the value of 
the gender gap which began at a $10,000 starting 
salary difference in earnings will project to a 
$600,000 gap over the course of their careers 
(Bowles, et al., 2005).  Reflecting back to 
Maureen Parks – had she been aware of the 
equivalent or even greater importance in 
negotiating for herself as she deemed important 
for her employees, she would not had suffered a 
financial and professional disconnect.  Had the 
female graduates in the Carnegie Mellon study 
detected an opportunity to negotiate the starting 
salaries with prospective employers, the wage 
gap would have lessened.  Erasing the 
ambiguous parameters in the salary negotiation 
further deteriorates the difference.  Offering 
equal fortitude in negotiating for oneself as for 
another suggest an advantage.  The cues, rather 
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than acting as triggers for differentiating 
behaviors, need to be redirected into tools of 
awareness and sources for behavioral change.  
Becoming more aware of the situational triggers 
which cue an initiation of the negotiation 
process is a monumental step in a positive 
direction.   
Gender does not always play a role in 
negotiating.  People differ in their personalities, 
in their interests, in every aspect which defines 
an individual.  Decades of research suggests 
men and women diverge in what is described as 
gender-typical behaviors; patterns of behavior 
which are more prevalent with one gender.  The 
negotiating process tends to set the stage for a 
pronounced interaction which may exemplify 
these gender-typical behaviors.  Not all 
individuals display the magnitude of behaviors 
discussed, nor are most individuals extremists in 
gender-typical behaviors, however trends depict 
a majority demonstrate varying patterns 
associated with males and females.  Presented 
research and evidence illustrate how gender 
plays a role in negotiating in the initiation of the 
process, the context of the situation, the 
prevalence of cues which generate behavioral 
patterns, and the perception of success. 
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